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INTRODUCTION 
 
The contemporary European Union needs a stronger sense of identity 
to overcome its existing crises and divisions. Implementation of common 
European standards requires that the competing interests of Member States 
be reconciled in order to find a point of balance between the autonomy of 
legal  systems  and  the  idea  of  the  internal  market.  EU  law  is  constantly 
changing, which is reflected in the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European  Union  constituting  the  acquis  communautaire.  In  analysing 
judgments in the area of the EU citizenship and company law, one might 
discern a clear tendency of the Court of Justice to accentuate an EU identity, 
which  is  a  source  of  rights  for  citizens  or  companies,  independent  of 
particular Member States' legal  orders. EU identity manifests itself most 
strongly in the institution of EU citizenship, but in recent times the Court of 
Justice has emphasized the importance of identity also in connection with 
the operation of companies falling under Article 54 (1) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)1, which will be the subject of 
further consideration.      
 
 
I.  EU CITIZENSHIP AS A INDEPENDENT BASIS OF RIGHTS OF 
NATURAL PERSONS 
 
European  Union  citizenship  is  a  legal  bond  connecting  a  natural 
person with the Union, granting a given person certain rights and imposing 
obligations (theoretically) on him/her2. The introduction of EU citizenship 
by the Maastricht Treaty  resulted in the expansion of the subjective and 
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objective  scopes  of  natural  persons'  entitlements3.  All  Union  citizens, 
regardless  of  whether  they  conduct   economic  activity,  were  given  the 
opportunity to  invoke  the provisions of law   stipulated in the Treaty. It 
should be noted that EU citizenship has strengthened the link between  the 
Union and its citizens4.  
Initially,  EU  citizenship  was  perceived  symbolically ,5  and  its 
introduction  was  not  linked  with  significant  changes  in  the  set  of 
entitlements conferred under EU law upon the  citizens of Member States6, 
except for the right to participate in municipal elections as well as elections 
to the European Parliament as well as diplomatic and consular protection7. 
In  recent  years,  the  Court  of   Justice  has  questioned  this  view  of  EU 
citizenship, and through its rulings it has imparted real significance to the 
entitlements  resulting  from  TFEU 8.  The  jurisprudence   of  the  Court   of 
Justice on EU citizenship has also been affected by amendments introduced 
into the Treaties. 
 
 
Under  the  current  wording  of  the  relevant  regulations,  EU 
citizenship is mentioned in both Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU)9 and in Article 20 of the TFEU.  The TEU contains provisions of a 
general  nature  while  the  s ection  from  the  TFEU  regarding  citizenship 
constitutes a complimentary set of regulations10. 
According to  Article 20 of the TFEU , ‘Every  person holding the 
nationality  of  a  Member  State  shall  be  a  citizen  of  the  Union.’  EU 
citizenship is acquired automatically by each natural person belonging to a 
Member State and ‘shall be additional to (…) national citizenship.’ This 
passage demonstrates a  shift  towards strengthening the institution of EU 
citizenship, since the previous provision stipulated that EU citizenship ‘shall 
                                                 
3 See Krystyna Kowalik-Bańczyk in Andrzej Wróbel (ed), Traktat o funkcjonowaniu Unii 
Europejskiej. Komentarz do art. 1-89 (Warsaw 2012) 437. 
4  See  Annette  Schrauwen,  ‘The  Future  of  EU  Citizenship:  Corrosion  of  National 
Citizenship?’ (Amsterdam 2009) 2, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1375413; Francis 
G Jacobs, ‘Citizenship of the European Union-A Legal Analysis’ (2007) 13 European Law 
Journal 591-610. 
5  See  Dimitry  Kochenov,  ‘Ius  Tractum  of  Many  Faces:  European  Citizenship  and  the 
Difficult Relationship between Status and Rights’ (2009) 15 Columbia Journal of European 
Law 172; Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future’ (2007) 
13 European Law Journal 623-628. 
6 See Samantha Besson,  Andr￩ Utzinger,  ‘Introduction: Future Challenges of European 
Citizenship—Facing a Wide-Open Pandora’s Box’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal 574. 
7  See  Dora  Kostakopoulou,  ‘Ideas,  Norms  and  European  Citizenship:  Explaining 
Institutional Change’ (2005) 68 The Modern Law Review 234. 
8  See  inter  alia  Cases  C-224/98  Marie-Nathalie  D'Hoop  v  Office  national  de  l'emploi 
[2002] ECR I-06191; C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v Belgian State [2003] ECR I-11613; 
Joined Cases C-502/01 and C-31/02 Silke Gaumain-Cerri v Kaufmännische Krankenkasse - 
Pflegekasse and Maria Barth v Landesversicherungsanstalt Rheinprovinz [2004] ECR I-
06483;  C-499/06  Halina  Nerkowska  v  Zakład  Ubezpieczeń  Społecznych  Oddział  w 
Koszalinie [2008] ECR I-03993; C-135/08 Janko Rottman v Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR 
I-01449; C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] 
ECR I-01177. 
9 Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/13. 
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complement (…) national citizenship.’11  This change is not accidental or 
without meaning12. Recent decisions of the Court of Justice confirm that EU 
citizenship bestows upon citizens a guarantee of exercise of their rights as 
granted under the Treaty independently of  those derived from the internal 
law  of  individual  Member  States  –  EU  citizenship  is  becoming  an 
independent structure, thereby strengthening the position of the individual 
with regard to the internal laws of the Member States13.  
The new approach of the Court  of Justice  regarding the rights to 
which every citizen of the Union is entitled was clearly expressed in  the 
Rottmann case14, in which the Court considered whether the loss of national 
citizenship  (which,  according  to  international   law,  falls  within  the 
competence of the Member States) might be adjudicated with respect to EU 
law if that loss results in the additional loss of EU citizenship .  Janko 
Rottman, an Austrian citizen, settled in Germany and applied for German 
citizenship.  Once  his  application  was  granted,  he  was  denaturalized  in 
Austria.  However, the decision on naturalization in German y  was then 
reversed due to his withholding information of proceedings pending against 
him. Had this decision come into force, denaturalizatio n would have given 
him the status of a stateless person, thereby causing the loss of EU citizen 
status15.  
In his opinion to the  Rottmann  case,  Advocate  General  Maduro 
advanced a very restrictive interpretation of the scope of EU citizenship, 
holding that a cross-border element was necessary in that case16. Advocate 
General Maduro identified such a foreign element, and declared the case to 
be admissible for a preliminary ruling17.  
Having  analysed  the  presented  preliminary  questio ns,  the  Court 
stated, in contrast to the approach taken by Advocate General Maduro in his 
Opinion, that  it is not necessary to demonstrate  the existence of a cross 
border element since:  
‘It is clear that the situation of a citizen of the Union who, like 
the applicant in the main proceedings, is faced with a decision 
withdrawing his naturalisation, adopted by the authorities of one 
                                                 
11 Article 17 of Treaty establishing the European Community [1997] OJ C340/173. 
12  See  Marek  Safjan,  ‘Between  Mangold  and  Omega:  Fundamental  Rights  versus 
Constitutional  Identity’  (2012)  3  Il  diritto  dell’Unione  europea  442-449.  In  the  earlier 
literature, see Annette Schrauwen, ‘European Union Citizenship in the Treaty of Lisbon: 
Any Change at All?’ (2008) 1 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 55-64. 
13 See Safjan (n 12) 445. 
14 Case C-135/08 Janko Rottman (n 8). 
15 Case C-135/08 Janko Rottman (n 8) paras 22-28. 
16 ‘However, even though a situation concerns a subject the regulation of which comes 
within the competence of the Member States, it falls within the scope of ratione materiae of 
Community law if it involves a foreign element, that is, a cross-border dimension’, see 
Case C-135/08 Janko Rottman (n 8) Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, para 10. The 
link between the rights attached to EU citizenship and a cross-border element has also been 
perceived by doctrine, see inter alia  Schrauwen (n 4) 3. 
17 Case C-135/08 Janko Rottman (n 8) Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, para 11; See 
also: Cases C-148/02 Garcia Avello (n 8) para 24; C-76/05 Herbert Schwarz and Marga 
Gootjes-Schwarz v Finanzamt Bergisch Gladbach [2007] ECR I-06849 para 87; C-209/03 
The Queen, on the application of Dany Bidar v London Borough of Ealing and Secretary of 
State for Education and Skills [2005] ECR I-2119, para 33; C-403/03 Egon Schempp v 
Finanzamt München V [2005] ECR I-06421 paras 17 and 18; C-499/06 Nerkowska (n 8) 
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Member State, and placing him, after he has lost the nationality 
of  another  Member  State  that  he  originally  possessed,  in  a 
position capable of causing him to lose the status conferred by 
Article 17 EC and the rights attaching thereto falls, by reason of 
its nature and its consequences, within the ambit of European 
Union law (emphasis added).’18  
In other words, Member States are obliged to take EU law  into account 
when exercising their powers in the sphere of nationality19. In its judgment 
the Court of Justice confirmed that a decision on revoking nationalization 
should be  taken  in the context of rights resulting from EU citizenship, 
respecting the principle of  proportionality20. Thus, EU citizenship can no 
longer  be  perceived  only  as  an  institution  supplementing  national 
citizenship,  but  as  an  independent  basis  for  the  creation  of   specific 
entitlements for individuals21. After the Rottmann judgment, there can be no 
doubt that Member States do not wield absolute  power over the granting 
and revocation of citizenship, but they must instead do so with regard for 
the acquis communautaire22. In that regard, the Rottmann case might be 
perceived as a revolution in the approach to the scope of rights resulting 
from EU citizenship, and it is a significant development in the context of 
understanding the notion of EU identity23.  
 
 
II.  COMPANIES’ EXISTENCE WITHIN THE INTERNAL MARKET 
 
In the case of natural persons, acquiring EU citizenship constitutes a 
preliminary  condition  to  enjoying the freedom  of establishment, whereas 
with  respect  to  companies  ‘EU  membership’  plays  a  similar  role.  This 
‘membership’  does  not  constitute  an  inherent  trait  of  each  company 
operating on the internal market. Placing a company under the EU legal 
                                                 
18 Case C-135/08 Janko Rottman (n 8) para 42. 
19  Case  C-135/08  Janko  Rottman  (n  8)  para  45.  On  the  consequences  of  the  Court’s 
position, see Dimitry Kochenov, ‘A Real European Citizenship; A New Jurisdiction Test; A 
Novel Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe’ (2011) 18  Columbia Journal of 
European Law 75-80. 
20 Case C-135/08 Janko Rottman (n 8) paras 56 and 58. 
21 See also Safjan (n 12) 442-449. 
22  See also Dimitry Kochenov,  ‘Case  C-135/08,  Janko  Rottmann  v.  Freistaat  Bayern, 
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 March 2010’ (2010) 47 Common Market 
Law Review 1846. Moreover, according to settled case-law EU citizenship is intended to be 
‘the  fundamental  status  of  nationals  of  the  Member  States’,  see  Cases  C-184/99  Rudy 
Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193 
para 31; Case C-200/02 Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State 
for  the  Home  Department  [2004]  ECR  I-09925  para  25;  Case  C-76/05  Schwarz  and 
Gootjes-Schwarz (n 17) para 86; C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano (n 8) para 41; C-256/11 
Murat Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres [2011], not yet published, para 
62. 
23 On European Civic Identity, see inter alia Paul Magnette, ‘How can one be European? 
Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal 
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order is effected provided that the two conditions set out in article 54 (1) of 
TFEU are met24. As the cited provision states:  
‘Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a 
Member  State  and  having  their  registered  office,  central 
administration or principal place of business within the Union 
shall (…) be treated in the same way as natural persons who 
are nationals of Member States.’    
It should be emphasized that within the EU legal order, companies set up 
under the internal laws of the Member States are defined in Court of Justice 
jurisprudence  as  ‘creatures  of  national  law’25.  If  companies  have  their 
registered office26, central administration27 or principal place of business 28 
within the  EU, they then fall under the subjective scope of protection of 
freedom of establishment. Under the wording of the Treaty, the necessity of 
fulfilling the two  aforementioned conditions is not in doubt . However, a 
highly controversial position is supported by the Court of Justice according 
to which  ‘companies (…) exist only by virtue of the national legislation 
which determines their incorporation and functioning’29 (emphasis added). 
While the incorporation of a company depends on the national law of each 
Member State30, its further functioning must be considered in accordance 
with the provisions of the TFEU. Establishing an entity in accordance with 
the law of one of the Member States causes the creation of a European 
Union entity, i.e. an entity the rights and duties of which should be assessed 
in light of the TFEU rules on freedom of establishment31.  
Differentiating  between  ‘EU  entities’  and  ‘national  entities’  of 
companies  is  not  a  new  concept.  However,  it  has  only  recently  gained 
                                                 
24 See Jacek Napierała, Europejskie prawo spółek (Warsaw 2006) 12-13, Ewa Skibińska, 
Swoboda zakładania przedsiębiorstw przez osoby prawne (art. 43-48 TWE) (Warsaw 2008) 
83-97; Aleksander Cieśliński, Wspólnotowe prawo gospodarcze (Warsaw 2003) 197-198. 
25  See Cases  C-378/10  VALE  Épít￩si  kft  [2012],  not  yet  published,  para  27;  C-210/06 
CARTESIO Oktató ￩s Szolg￡ltató bt [2008] ECR I-9641 para 104; 81/87 The Queen v H. 
M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust 
plc [1988] ECR 5483 para 19. 
26  The  registered  office  (si￨ge  statutaire)  of  the  company  is  the  place  chosen  by  the 
founders in the company statutes as well as the place of the registration, see Jean Schapira, 
Georges Le Tallec, Jean-Bernard Blaise, Laurence Idot, Droit europ￩en des affaires, t. II 
(PUF 1999) 568; Guy Mustaki, Val￩rie Engammare, Droit europ￩en des soci￩t￩s (Helbing 
Lichtenhahn 2009) 10. Some authors distinguish the registered office from the statutory 
seat, see inter alia Adam Opalski, Europejskie prawo spółek (Warsaw 2010) 90. 
27 The central administration of the company is called the  ‘real seat’ and means the place 
where the essential decisions are made by the board's members - senior management, see 
inter alia Maurice Cozian, Alain Viandier, Florence Deboissy, Droit des soci￩t￩s (Litec 
2007) 106; Mustaki and Engammare (n 26) 11. 
28  A  principal  place of business could be described as the location where  the  material 
resources  and personnel  of the company are concentrated, see  inter  alia  Mustaki  and 
Engammare (n 26) 11. 
29 See Cases  C-378/10 VALE (n 25) para 27; C-210/06 Cartesio (n 25) para 104; 81/87 
Daily Mail and General Trust (n 25) para 19. 
30 See also Veronika Korom, Peter Metzinger, ‘Freedom of Establishment for Companies: 
The  European  Court  of  Justice  Confirms  and  Refines  its  Daily  Mail  Decision  in  the 
Cartesio Case C-210/06’ (2009) 6 European Company and Financial Law Review 150. 
31  See Elena Dubovizkaja,   ‘Uberseering-Rechtsprechung:  Gerichtliche  Klarstellung  zur 
Niederlassungsfreiheit  von  Gesellschaften’  (2003)  12  GmbH-Rundschau  698;  Marek 
Szydło, ‘The right of Companies to Cross-Border Conversion under the TFEU Rules on 
Freedom of Establishment’ (2010) 3 European Company and Financial Law Review 429. 53  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 3:1 
 
 
particular importance in light of the Court of Justice jurisprudence regarding 
the EU citizenship to which natural persons are entitled. In the Rottmann 
case, the Court of Justice determined that the matter of loss of citizenship 
falling within the competence of the Member States cannot be examined 
separately from the entitlements arising from EU citizenship. In the case of 
companies, to which article 54 (1) TEU applies, it is time for the Court of 
Justice to confirm that the question of their functioning is not within the sole 
competence of Member States32.  
While keeping in mind the passage that gives companies the right to 
enjoy the freedom of establishment (‘companies (…) shall (…) be treated in 
the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member States’), the 
consequences  resulting from the proposed interpretation of article 54 (1) 
TFEU should be considered. Incorporation of an ‘EU entity’ depends on (as 
it  results  from  the  wording  of  the  referred  provision)  incorporation  of  a 
‘national  entity’,  whereas  its  further  functioning  (including  dissolution) 
requires acquis communautaire to be taken into account, which means that 
in a particular situation the provisions of national law may not apply.  
Problems regarding companies' mobility processes (including cross-
border restructuring) have not been solved within the internal market33. A 
consequence of  the dynamic development of European company law is a 
quest  for  instr uments  and  legal  solutions  that  would  help  ensure 
optimisation of conducting cross -border economic activity 34.  Companies 
enjoying the right to free movement  under the freedom of establishment 
have long encountered obstacles to emigration and immigration35. Based on 
previous judgments, one may conclude that Member States are obliged to 
refrain from any action that could make it difficu lt for companies to enjoy 
the rights granted by the Court of Justice , e.g. they cannot freely (without 
reasonable  justification  and  within  limits  determined  by  the  Court  of 
Justice) impede the processes under discussion ; however, practice shows 
that companies' rights are not adequately protected.  
                                                 
32  See  Agnieszka  Guzewicz,  ‘Transgraniczne  połączenia  oraz  przekształcenia  spółek  w 
świetle  acquis communautaire’ in Józef Frąckowiak (ed), Kodeks spółek handlowych po 
dziesięciu latach (Wrocław 2013) 638-641. 
33 On the differences between various Member States with regard to dissolution, liquidation 
and continuation of companies, see Jan Schouten, ‘Continuation of the Legal Entity that has 
been Dissolved in a European Perspective’ (2008) 5 European Company Law 13-19. 
34  On the development of European company law, see  inter  alia:  Michel  Menjucq,  La 
mobilit￩  des  soci￩t￩s  dans  l’espace  europ￩en  (LGDJ  1997);  Andr￩  Decocq,  Georges 
Decocq, Droit europ￩en des affaires (L.G.D.J. 2003); Stefano Tafani, Roberto Caruso, Il 
nuovo diritto europeo delle societ￠ di capitali (Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato 2005); Stefan 
Grundmann,  European  Company  Law.  Organization,  Finance  and  Capital  Markets 
(Intersentia 2007); Mads Andenas, Frank Wooldridge,  European Comparative Company 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2009); Gert-Jan Vossestein, Modernization of European 
Company  Law  and  Corporate  Governance.  Some  Considerations  on  its  Legal  Limits 
(Kluwer Law International 2010); Ulf Bernitz, Wolf-Georg Ringe (eds), Company Law and 
Economic  Protectionism.  New  Challenges  to  European  Integration  (Oxford  University 
Press  2010);  Elisabetta  Pederzini,  Percorsi  di  diritto  societario  europeo  (Giappichelli 
2011). 
35 See Cases 81/87  Daily Mail and General Trust (n 25); C-208/00  ￜberseering BV v 
Nordic  Construction  Company  Baumanagement  GmbH  (NCC)  [2002]  ECR  I-09919; 
C-411/03 SEVIC Systems AG [2005] ECR I-10805; C-210/06 Cartesio (n 25); Case C-
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Referring to the decision of the Court recently issued in the VALE 
case on 12 July 2012 concerning the right to cross-border conversion, many 
difficulties  would  have  been  avoided,  and  the  rights  resulting  from  the 
freedom  of  establishment  would  not  have  been  violated,  if  the  VALE 
company  could  have  completed  the  process  of  cross-border  conversion 
based on the ‘EU entity’ concept36.   
In this case, a limited liability company governed by Italian law, 
VALE Costruzioni, asked to be removed from the commercial register, while 
at  the  same  time  intending  to  transfer  its  seat  and  economic  activity  to 
Hungary37. As a result of its application, the company was stricken from the 
commercial register in Italy.  It was noted in the   Italian register that the 
company  had  transferred its seat to Hungary .  A few months later, the 
articles of association of VALE Épít￩si were adopted, and a limited liability 
company  in  a  formation  governed  by  Hungarian  law  was  subsequently 
created38. VALE Épít￩si applied for registration in the commercial register in 
Hungary while designating VALE Costruzioni as its predecessor in law39 
(that is, the company established and removed from the commercial register 
in Italy). The application was rejected first by  the Commercial Court and 
then by the Appeals Court. Finally, the matter was referred to the Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling.   
The  company  VALE  had  intended  to  complete  a  cross-border 
conversion process based on the Treaty rules on freedom of establishment40. 
                                                 
36  Cross-border  reorganization  processes  have  already  been  analysed  by  the  Court  of 
Justice, however, the VALE case is the first case in which the Court considered the situation 
of cross-border conversion of a capital company. As far as previous decisions regarding the 
cross-border  mobility  of  companies  are  concerned,  the  theses  expressed  in  cases 
ￜberseering, SEVIC and Cartesio are of particular importance to the issues discussed. In its 
ￜberseering judgment the Court acknowledged that it was incompatible with the Treaty 
provisions on freedom of establishment for the host Member State to deny legal capacity to 
a company established in another Member State which had transferred its real seat to the 
first  Member  State  whilst  maintaining  its  status  as  a  company  incorporated  under  the 
legislation of the home Member State (C-208/00 ￜberseering (n 35) para 95). In the SEVIC 
case, the Court stressed that domestic regulation which introduces a general ban on entering 
cross-border  mergers  into  a  register  while  allowing  such  entries  provided  that  both 
companies  have  their  registered  office  in  this  Member  State  is  inconsistent  with  the 
provisions on freedom of establishment (C-411/03 SEVIC Systems (n 35) para 31). Ruling 
in  the  next  case,  the  Court  of  Justice  acknowledged  that  cross-border  transfer  of  a 
company’s  real  seat  with  retention  of  its  status  as  a  company  incorporated  under  the 
legislation of the home Member State does not enter into the scope of protection of freedom 
of establishment (C-210/06 Cartesio (n 25) para 110). Nevertheless, in the next points of its 
judgment,  the  Court  affirmed  the  companies’  right  to  cross-border  conversion.  In  the 
aforementioned  situation,  a  company  moves  its  seat  abroad,  changing  its  statute  and 
adapting  to  the  requirements  in  force  in  the  host  Member  State.  The  winding-up  or 
liquidation of the company is not then possible in the home Member State, to the extent that 
the law of the host Member State allows such conversion (C-210/06 Cartesio (n 25) para 
110). 
37  Case C-378/10  VALE  (n  25)  para  9.  Company  VALE  intended  to  transfer  both  its 
registered office and central administration from Italy to Hungary. 
38 Case C-378/10 VALE (n 25) para 10. 
39 Case C-378/10 VALE (n 25) para 11. 
40 See inter alia Pierre-Henri Conac, ‘La CJUE reconnaît le transfert international de si￨ge 
et  ouvre  la  voie  à  une  directive’  (2012)  44  Recueil  Le  Dalloz  3009-3013;  Thomas 
Mastrullo, ‘La cons￩cration du droit à la transformation transfrontali￨re des soci￩t￩s dans 
l'Union europ￩enne’ (2012) 38 La Semaine Juridique - entreprise et affaires 23-26; Ildo D. 
Mpindi, ‘Mobilit￩ des soci￩t￩s dans l'espace europ￩en’ (2012) 74 Revue Lamy droit des 55  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 3:1 
 
 
Pursuant to Italian law (State of departure), VALE Costruzioni no longer 
existed because of its removal from the commercial register – it was no 
longer a national entity. Moreover, VALE Épít￩si did not yet exist as a legal 
person under Hungarian law (State of destination) since registration of the 
company in Hungary was refused41. It could be qualified as a company in 
formation,  and  in  consequence  it  had  the  legal  capacity  to  initiate 
proceedings before both national and European courts42.  
The company’s non-existence under Italian law was one of the main 
grounds  for  refusal  of  its  registration.  Nevertheless,  the  Hungarian 
authorities did not take into consideration the documents issued by Italian 
authorities  in  order  to  determine  if  the  company  complied  with  the 
conditions laid down in the Member State of origin. The Court of Justice 
noted  that, pursuant to the principle of effectiveness, during the registration 
procedure the authorities of the Member State of destination are required to 
take due account of documents obtained from the authorities of the Member 
State of departure43. In that regard the competent authorities shall examine if 
the said company maintains its status as an existing subject of law , which 
enables it to complete the cross-border conversion. It should be emphasized 
that the extract from the Italian commercial register confirmed that  ‘the 
company (had) moved to Hungary’44.  
In  these  circumstances,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  converting 
company, VALE, complied with the two conditions provided for in Article 
54 (1) TFEU and, consequently, could be recognized as an ‘EU entity’. In 
its judgement the Court stated:   
‘that  question  relates  to  the  examination,  to  be  made  by  the 
Hungarian authorities, of the issue whether VALE Costruzioni 
disassociated  itself  from  Italian  law,  in  accordance  with  the 
conditions  laid  down  thereunder,  while  retaining  its  legal 
personality,  thereby  enabling  it  to  convert  into  a  company 
governed by Hungarian law.’ 45 (emphasis added).    
In this statement the Court acknowledged – indirectly – the existence and 
the importance of an ‘EU entity’ which can operate irrespective of national 
legal orders46.  
 
                                                                                                                            
affaires 15; J￩rôme Vermeylen, ‘Arr￪t  ﾫVALE Épít￩si ﾻ: la  mobilit￩ transfrontali￨re du 
si￨ge statutaire est-elle un droit?’(2012) 9 Journal de droit europ￩en 276-278. 
41 See Case C-378/10 VALE (n 25), Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, paras 44-45. 
42 Companies with legal personality as well as companies without legal personality yet 
having legal capacity are subject to the scope of protection of freedom of establishment, see 
Mustaki and Engammare (n 26)  6; On various entities being subject s of civil law, see J  
Frąckowiak, ‘Adresaci norm prawa prywatnego - podmioty stosunków cywilnoprawnych’ 
in J Gudowski, K Weitz (eds), Aurea praxis, aurea theoria. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci 
Porfesora Tadeusza Erecińskiego, t. II (Warsaw 2011) 2263-2278. 
43 See also Paweł Błaszczyk, ‘Glosa do wyroku TS z dnia 12 lipca 2012 r., C-378/10’ 
(2012)  11  Europejski  Przegląd  Sądowy  43;  More  precisely,  the  Member  State  of 
destination  shall  examine  the  documents  certifying  that  the  converting  company  has 
complied with all requirements laid down in the Member State of departure provided that 
those conditions are compatible with acquis communautaire, see Case C-378/10 VALE (n 
25) para 61. 
44 See Case C-378/10 VALE (n  25), Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, para 11. 
45 Case C-378/10 VALE (n 25) para 58. 
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III.  CONSEQUENCES OF RECOGNITION OF THE EU ENTITY 
 
In the VALE case, the Court of Justice ruled that a regulation that 
allows in a general manner (as in the case of the Hungarian provisions) for 
different  treatment  of  domestic  and  foreign  companies  in  relation  to  the 
transformation process is inconsistent with EU law47. A similar view was 
expressed earlier in the SEVIC case with regard to mergers of companies48. 
Moreover, for the purposes of cross-border conversion processes, the Court 
of Justice noted that the authorities of a Member State of destination are 
obliged to record in the commercial register the company of the Mem ber 
State of origin as the ‘predecessor in law’ to the converted company, if such 
a  record  is  possible  in  relation  to  domestic  conversions49.  However, the 
legislation of a Member State of destination may impose “strict legal and 
economic continuity between the predecessor company which applied to be 
converted  and  the  converted  successor  company’,  provided  that  such  a 
requirement is held in relation to domestic companies50.  
The concept of  an  ‘EU  entity’  fits  perfectly  into  the  context  of 
maintaining  the  legal subjectivity of  a  converted company. This  concept 
makes it possible to overcome the differences among the legal systems of 
particular Member States through acceptance of a legal fiction. This legal 
fiction is based on the assumption that there is an entity at the EU level that, 
having cited the Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment, may effect 
a cross-border transformation regardless of restrictions enacted in national 
legislation. Thus, once having fulfilled the requirements necessary for cross-
border  conversion,  the  regulations  of  the  State  of  departure  require  the 
company’s obligatory dissolution, it will be able to enjoy the status of ‘EU 
entity’ in the State of destination on condition that such a company fulfils 
the two conditions set out in Article 54 (1) TFEU. The first condition will be 
fulfilled as a matter of course because the company, in connection with the 
first  incorporation,  is  already  subject  to  the  protection  of  freedom  of 
establishment;  deletion  of the  company  from  the register in  the State  of 
origin  for  the  purposes  of  cross-border  conversion,  according  to  the 
proposed interpretation,  can not  thwart this  effect.  Therefore, the second 
condition,  associated  with  having  a  seat  in  the  territory  of  one  of  the 
Member  States,  will  be  decisive.  When  assessing  the  second  condition, 
consideration might be made of the location of the central administration, 
which is the place where decision-makers are seated, or the principal place 
of business, i.e. the location where material resources and personnel (of the 
company) are concentrated. In order to ensure the protection of creditors 
and  certainty  of  legal  transactions,  the  register  of  the  State  of  departure 
                                                 
47 Case C-378/10 VALE (n 25) para 41. The VALE case is examined from the State of 
destination’s point of view, therefore it refers to the situation of a company’s immigration 
as opposed to the Cartesio case regarding a company’s emigration. Both judicial decisions 
now constitute the basis for conducting the cross-border transformation of companies in the 
internal market. In both decisions the Court of Justice confirmed that the absence of rules 
laid down in secondary EU law cannot prevent the freedom of establishment from being 
exercised; see Cases C-378/10 VALE (n 25) para 38 and C-411/03 SEVIC Systems (n 35) 
para 26. 
48 C-411/03 SEVIC Systems (n 35) paras 22-23. 
49 Case C-378/10 VALE (n 25) para 56. 
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should include a clear reference to which Member State the company is 
transferred; hence the process of conversion could be completed only in this 
Member State. This would serve as a basis to distinguish between definitive 
dissolution and liquidation of the company and the transfer of its business to 
another Member State. When these conditions are fulfilled, the cross-border 
conversion will not be blocked due to the fact the company ceased to exist51.  
Recognition  of  the  “EU  entity’  should  strengthen  the 
competitiveness  of  companies  incorporated  within  the  internal  market  in 
relation  to  companies  operating  outside  from  it  (e.g.  in  the  USA). 
Companies’ supranational identity should affect cross-border reorganization 
processes through minimizing the occurrence of refusal of registration. At 
the  same  time,  the  authorities  in  the  Member State  of  departure  will  be 
obliged to ensure that reliable and transparent information is easily available 
to creditors and minority shareholders. As far as this issue is concerned, a 
significant role should also be assigned in the future to the EU Companies’ 
Register.  A  new  legal  instrument  has  recently  been  adopted:  Directive 
2012/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2012 
amending Council Directive 89/666/EEC and Directives 2005/56/EC and 
2009/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the 
interconnection of central, commercial and companies registers52. This is a 
new challenge for EU institutions and Member States .  As the European 
Parliament  emphasized  in  its  resolution  of  7  September  2010  on  the 
interconnection of business registers, the further integration of the European 
Economic Area can only be exploited if all Member States take part in the 
network53. Cooperation between registers of all Member States  will enable 
the processing of data concerning  companies’ legal and financial situation 
within the internal market. Each company will obtain a unique number in 
order to be easily identified within the European Economic Area54. Member 
States should ensure the reliability of documents and data. The coordination 
                                                 
51 The success of cross-border transformation depends also on other factors, which is why 
adopting an act of European importance seems ultimately necessary. In the EU, there are 
already provisions relating to cross-border restructuring of companies which may be useful 
when it comes to establishing future regulations. At this point the following provisions 
should be noted: Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 October 2005 on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies [2005] OJ L 310/1 
and Council Regulation 2001/2157/EC of 8.10.2001 on the Statute for a European company 
[2001] OJ L 294/1.  The directive on the cross-border transfer of registered office was 
drafted but, work on it was discontinued (see inter alia Gert-Jan Vossestein, 'Transfer of the 
Registered Office: The European Commission's Decision Not to Submit a Proposal for a 
Directive’  (2008)  4  Utrecht  Law  Review  58-61).  On  14  January  2013  the  European 
Commission started public consultation on the cross-border transfers of registered offices 
of companies. All citizens and organisations are welcome to contribute to this consultation 
(see  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/seat-transfer/index_en.htm). 
The consultation is the result of the adoption of the ‘Action Plan’ in December 2012 by the 
Commission:  European  company  law  and  corporate  governance  (available  at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/modern/index_en.htm#  actionplan2012), 
containing  priorities  regarding  development  of  European  company  law  for  the  coming 
years, among which intensification of legal actions related to cross-border operations was 
mentioned. In the near future, the EU’s institutions should take legislative action towards 
regulation of cross-border conversion of companies.  
52 [2012] OJ L156/1. 
53 See Directive 2012/17/EU, para 7. 
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of the different legal systems will strengthen economic cooperation in the 
European sphere.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
A distinct separation of rights arising from European and national 
status may contribute to the strengthening of economic integration in the 
internal  market.  As  in  the  case  of  EU  citizenship,  ‘EU  entity’  status 
constitutes an independent category. Establishing the scope of rights arising 
from this status should take place gradually, as expressed in the decisions of 
the Court of Justice.  
The  development  of  European  company  law  should  be  oriented 
towards the creation of favourable conditions for companies going through 
cross-border restructuring on the one hand, whereas on the other it should 
ensure protection of the interests of various entities, particularly creditors. 
The concept of ‘EU entity’ is suited to both of these purposes, therefore it is 
worth being developed by the Court of Justice in future judicial decisions. 
National entities established on various grounds and having diverse 
internal  structures  should  have  an  opportunity  to  appeal  to  their 
supranational identity when enjoying the freedom of establishment. Whether 
this status could become an autonomous one in the future, independent of 
particular domestic legal orders, remains an entirely different issue. 
 
 
 